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Abstract 
 
Recently in this journal, Hughes and colleagues discussed special funding 
status to ultra-orphan drugs. They concluded that there should be a uniform 
policy for the provision of orphan drugs across Europe; that complete 
restriction was impractical, and that UK policy should aspire to the values of 
the EU directive on orphan drugs. We critically assess these arguments, 
demonstrating that they failed to justify special status for treatments for rare 
diseases.    
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Introduction 
 
 
Hughes et al. in discussing arguments for and against giving special funding 
status to ultra-orphan drugs,1concluded that there should be a uniform policy 
across Europe; complete restriction was impractical; UK policy should aspire 
to the values of the EU directive.   
 
The aims of this paper are to correct the inaccuracies in the original paper; 
develop some of the key issues; and to draw some conclusions regarding the 
question – ‘Do drugs for exceptionally rare disease deserve special status for 
funding?’. 
 
For ease, our paper adopts the same structure as the original. 
 
Special status considerations 
 
Hughes et al. state that a key issue is ‘whether the rarity and gravity of the 
condition represents a rational basis for applying a different value to health 
gain…’.1  
 
The defining characteristic of an orphan drug is that it treats a rare disease. 
However, the justification for special funding frequently rests upon the ‘gravity’ 
of the condition. To examine whether orphan drug legislation accurately 
represents societal preferences it would be necessary to ask whether society 
was willing to pay more for treatments for rare severe disorders than for 
prevalent severe disorders. No study has done this. 
 
Hughes et al recount another frequently cited argument for special treatment 
– ‘ensuring access to treatment where no other treatment exists.’ Like ‘gravity’ 
this is not a defining characteristic of an orphan drug, but it is a frequently 
cited argument for their special status in licensing and reimbursement. 1 Not 
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being unique to orphan drugs, it cannot be a justification for their special 
status.    
 
Further, this argument contains an implicit preference for biological disease 
modification over health gain. In the developed world “no other treatment” is a 
substantial misrepresentation of reality; patients are simply not left with no 
medical treatment at all. The dichotomy is between best supportive care and 
disease modifying care. Best supportive care could have a greater impact 
upon health related quality of life than a pharmaceutical agent. For example; 
£7,500 per patient per year spent on home helps services could have a 
greater impact on the health related quality of life of someone with multiple 
sclerosis than spending the same money on a disease modifying therapy 
such beta interferon.  If the objective of the health care system is to improve 
health then health gain from best supportive care should not be valued less 
than health gain from disease modifying therapy.   
 
It is legitimate to specify different or additional objectives. Indeed the 
Department of Health requires the NHS to promote population health and 
innovation.  Palmer and Smith2 argue that new therapies have an option 
value, which should be taken into account in reimbursement decisions. 
Disease modifying therapies, unlike best supportive care, offer the option of 
future knowledge, which may in turn, lead to a cure. Decisions not to 
reimburse new therapies reduce the incentives to pursue future knowledge 
and thus the hope of a cure. Again, this argument is not unique to orphan 
drugs; there are many prevalent diseases for which there is no cure. The 
decision not to reimburse the latest therapy always has implications for the 
development of future knowledge.  
 
Methodological issues concerning evidence on effectiveness 
 
Hughes et al repeat the generally accepted argument that it is often not 
possible to recruit an adequate sample size (to an RCT) to test treatments for 
very rare diseases.1  It is undoubtedly true that treatments for extremely rare 
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diseases are often licensed on the basis of extremely small clinical studies. 
However, it is far from clear that more robust evidence could not be provided. 
For example, Ceredase, a treatment for Gauchers Disease was initially 
licensed on the basis of a study which recruited 12 people. Within ten years 
the Gauchers Registry had approximately 3000 patients on therapy; casting 
doubt over the assumed difficulty in undertaking a conventional randomised 
controlled trial.3 
 
Hughes et al highlight the reliance on short-term surrogate outcomes in the 
evidence base for ultra-orphan drugs.1  They propose improvements in post 
marketing studies and the development of registries to address the limitations 
of the evidence. However, the major uncertainty in establishing the 
effectiveness of ultra orphan drugs is the natural history of the disease. 3 The 
opportunity to collect information on the natural history of a disease is 
significantly reduced once a disease modifying therapy becomes available.  
Post-marketing studies cannot address this primary uncertainty in the 
evidence base. 
 
Registries of all patients with the disease are required to address this 
uncertainty. To ensure these data are available, regulatory authorities need to 
require that such registries are established when a therapy is given orphan 
designation.  This would provide evidence on the natural history of the 
disease at the time of licensing so that authorities could accurately assess a 
therapy’s effectiveness and cost effectiveness.  Such registries would also 
help identify subjects for recruitment to the clinical trial programme and 
provide the infrastructure necessary to implement the proposed post-licensing 
studies.1*  
 
In the absence of improvements in the quality of the evidence provided to 
licensing and reimbursement authorities, the weakness of the evidence does 
not represent an argument for excusing treatments for rare diseases from 
formal appraisal. Limited volume of data may be an insurmountable problem 
in the hypothesis testing paradigm adopted by the regulatory authorities. 
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However, it is not a problem in the decision analytic paradigm adopted by 
reimbursement authorities.4  
 
Limited Budget Impact 
 
Surprisingly, Hughes et al consider cost, divorced from any consideration of 
the opportunity cost.  They observe that a drug costing £50,000 per patient 
per year, would only cost £2.5 million a year if there were only 50 patients to 
be treated.1 However, the cost should not be considered without reference to 
the value of what is foregone;5  £2.5 million would pay for over 520 hip 
replacements.6     
 
 
Equity Issues  
 
Hughes et al consider what they call “the equity principle” and “a rights-based 
approach” to health care provision. They rightly conclude that neither will 
favour treatments for rare conditions over more prevalent conditions.  They 
then propose the “rule of rescue” as the basis for the special status for ultra-
orphan drugs.  Whilst acknowledging that the rule of rescue normally applies 
to the prevention of imminent death, they cite Hadorn to claim that it also  
applies when life is not endangered. 7 Thus, they interpret the rule of rescue 
as a commitment to the non-abandonment of individuals when (a) there is a 
small number of cases; (b) the condition is severe (but not necessarily 
immediately life threatening), and (c) no alternative treatments are available. 
 
If we are to accept (a) then we accept that whereas passengers in a car that 
is about to explode should be saved at all costs, passengers on a jumbo jet 
about to explode need not be, as the numbers are large!    Regarding (b), 
severity of the condition, the characteristic of an orphan drug is the rarity of 
the condition, so it makes no sense to justify special status in terms of 
severity.  Finally, (c) implies that if there is only one way to save lives then 
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these lives should be saved at all costs, but if there is more than one way to 
save the same lives then this no longer applies, which is also absurd.   
 
The paper gives an example of the ‘rule of rescue’ where children from poor 
countries with physical deformities are transported for treatment in rich 
countries.  This phenomenon is also known as giving priority or special 
treatment to the “identifiable victim”.  If the argument for special treatment 
actually rests upon the identifiable individual condition, then it is important to 
think through the implications for the funding of other interventions , because 
unlike the other characteristics, identifiability is a characteristic that is 
amenable to individual choice and control.  
 
Since the introduction of explicit prioritisation across the NHS, some 
individuals have sought to overturn local commissioners’ decisions using the 
media; the most recent example being the provision of herceptin to women 
with early breast cancer.8 Their publicity has created pressure to provide a 
very expensive therapy whose effectiveness is highly uncertain. 9 To enshrine 
special status for identified individuals would create an incentive for more 
people to use the media to achieve ‘identified individual’ status and thus 
overturn population level prioritisation decisions. 
 
The debate around ultra orphan drugs must recognise that the rule of rescue 
is not in fact a rule, but rather a concept that explains the observed instinctive 
emotional reactions of individuals to tragic events in urgent circumstances.  
The process of putting a name to the sentiment and showing that it is 
prevalent does not make it a valid basis for policy.  For the rule of rescue to 
be a valid basis for policy, it requires a normative justification.  
 
Whether an affected individual is known or unknown is merely a matter of time 
and perspective, i.e., someone may be regarded as an unknown statistical life 
to one observer but will be, or become identifiable to another. From the broad 
societal perspective we know that with enough information, or simply with 
time, those currently regarded as unknown statistical lives will become known. 
At this point, coherence in decision making requires that their health be 
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valued in the same way as currently ‘known’ lives.   Social decision making 
should reflect this broader view, and not give undue weight to values based in 
private perspectives and inadequate information.   The alternative is that any 
intervention will be cost effective as long as those who bear the opportunity 
cost are unknown to us at the time we make the decision. 10   
 
Options for Policy Recommendations 
Assigning equity weights 
 
The authors propose equity weights as a means of incorporating society’s 
preferences over prevalence into cost effectiveness analysis. However, equity 
weights are a purely technical means of incorporating established social 
preferences into the QALY framework.  Without robust evidence that society 
has a preference for rarity alone,11 equity weights are irrelevant. What little 
evidence there is does not support the existence of such preferences. Over 
80% of NICE’s Citizens Council said that rarity alone was not a reason to pay 
a premium price for a drug. Over 80% also said that disease severity might 
represent a basis for paying a premium. Only 3 members of the council (out of 
27) believed that rarity alone justified paying a premium. 12  
 
Risk sharing and ‘no cure, no pay’ schemes 
 
Hughes et al cite a number of conditional reimbursement systems that have 
been devised. Whilst broadly supporting such schemes, we note that the 
ability to establish that the therapy has delivered the claimed health gain is 
dependent upon the quality of the evidence on the natural history. The use of 
conditional reimbursement schemes further strengthens the argument for 
disease registries to be established when an investigational drug receives 
orphan designation. 
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Clinical and Pharmacogenetic criteria 
 
Whilst the specification of clinical criteria beyond the limitations set out in the 
license may reduce the total expenditure on a specific therapy – it will not, in 
itself address the challenge of the difference between the cost of the therapy 
and the value that society places upon the expected health gain.  If the criteria 
for reimbursement are clinical characteristics that are predictive of greater 
health gain from therapy, then there is the potential for more cost effective use 
of ultra-orphan drugs. However, the knowledge of the natural history of these 
extremely rare conditions is such that it is often not possible to specify a priori 
criteria that are reliably predictive of enhanced or reduced health gain. 3  
 
The authors describe a procedure developed in Ontario, Canada; whereby a 
committee of medical experts decides who should receive enzyme 
replacement treatment for Gauchers Disease. The effectiveness of the 
process cannot be established, as the knowledge of the natural history of 
Gauchers Disease is vanishingly small; and what data there is, is inconsistent.  
Even though it is a monogenetic disorder there are over 200 allele mutations; 
of which very few have been shown to be associated with milder or more 
severe forms of the disease.3   It is difficult to see how the medical experts 
can be confident as to the health gain from therapy as they cannot say with 
confidence what would happen in the absence of treatment. 
 
Funding by Research Councils 
 
There may be merit in the research councils funding research in to treatments 
for rare diseases. The condition being that the expected return on the 
research investment should exceed the cost of undertaking the research. 
Normally, when this condition is met, we would expect the private sector to be 
willing to invest in such research. This said, there are reasons why the private 
sector may not value future benefits correctly.10 In these circumstances, 
funding from the research councils may be appropriate. However, market 
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failure of this sort is not specific to rarity, and therefore it is not clear why rare 
diseases should have privileged access to limited research council resources.  
 
Dedicated Funding 
 
Dedicated funding is an increasingly common financing structure; especially 
within the UK NHS.  However, the question that faces decision makers is how 
much funding should dedicated to the care of a particular disease group. If the 
answer to this question is divorced from the value of the health gain produced, 
it is difficult to see how a specific allocation of resources, dedicated or 
otherwise, can be justified. Dedicated resources provide transparency about 
the implied value of health gain to the members of the population. However, it 
avoids the key policy question which is whether funding should be dedicated 
to the treatment of rare diseases, or others; i.e the opportunity cost issue is 
not resolved by dedicated funding. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Having reviewed their paper in some detail; we are left unconvinced that 
Hughes et al have furnished any sustainable arguments for giving special 
status to treatments for rare diseases. Perhaps because of this, their 
conclusion actually contains a new argument for special status – the 
‘unacceptability of postcode prescribing from an equity stance’. 1   
 
It is timely to note that postcode prescribing is the unavoidable result of 
devolving reimbursement decisions to local commissioners. Different localities 
have different health needs, priorities and budgets, and thus make different 
commissioning decisions. Postcode prescribing may be a sign of effective 
local commissioning. What is required for this variation to be acceptable is a 
legitimate process such as that described by Burls et al. 14 Arbitrary national 
interventions to address legitimate variation can damage the development of 
local health services and the efficient use of limited resources. 14 Whether the 
decision is made at a local or national level, the application of consistent, 
sustainable principles does not lead to a special status for treatments for rare 
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diseases. Arguing for national policies is irrelevant to making the case for 
special status for treatments for rare diseases. 
 
Hughes et al end their paper with the following statement – “It is clear that a 
complete restriction on the funding of ultra-orphan drugs is not a practical or 
realistic solution”.1 If the examination of the justifications for orphan status and 
conclusions about how in principle they should be evaluated is to be restricted 
to those answers which interested parties currently find to be ‘practical and 
reasonable’ then there seem little purpose in the preceding discussion. 
 
At no point in their paper have they made a convincing argument as to why 
this should be the case. What little evidence there is suggests that society 
does not view rarity alone as a strong reason to pay premium prices. 12 
Against this background, if the value of the expected health gain from the use 
of ultra-orphan drugs is less than the cost of those drugs, it is legitimate and 
appropriate to completely restrict their funding.  
 
Interestingly, little mention is made by Hughes et al, or others involved in this 
debate, of the prices of ultra orphan drugs. These prices are often 
extraordinarily high, in many cases higher by orders of magnitude than any 
other health technology.  Imatinib is priced at around £20k and ERT at around 
£80k per patient per annum. We know that some of these prices, notably 
imatinib have nothing to do with the costs of developing the compound. 15  
Similarly, with ceredase, the first ERT, there were plausible reasons for the 
extremely high initial cost, however its chemical synthesis should have 
reduced the cost substantially.16  
 
Pricing pharmaceuticals has little to do with the market.17  The state, through 
patent legislation, provides incentives for pharmaceutical research. The rules 
of patent protection, which are blunt and based on history rather than logic, 
have in many countries been altered to provide further incentives for research 
on rare diseases. 18 19 Contrary to expectations, some of the orphan drugs 
that resulted have been highly profitable, due largely to their unprecedentedly 
high prices.  
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Given that the case for orphan drug legislation had to with countering low 
profitability, an argument can be made for monitoring the effect the legislation 
has had, not only on the development of new drugs but also their prices. 
Orphan drug legislation has been one of the major changes in the patent 
regulation of pharmaceuticals, but one which has led to unexpected results, 
notably high prices.  At this time, rather than considering the extension of the 
privileged regulatory provision of treatments for rare diseases to the 
reimbursement arena; there is a need to review the rationale for and operation 
of the existing legislation. 
 
 
 
Footnote: 
* Disease registers can be usefully contrasted with health technology registers. Many of the registers in the UK can be described 
as technology registers; registers of those using particular technologies, rather than all those patients with the disease. If a disease 
register includes both patients who are using and those not using the technology, then provided other relevant factors are 
included, case control studies become possible. Given the high cost of many ultra orphan drugs, and the uncertainty of their 
effectiveness compared to no treatment, it seems reasonable for funding to be conditional on entry into disease registers. The 
advent of electronic patient records greatly reduces the previously high cost of disease registers. NICE has recommended the 
development of disease registers for several new technologies 
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